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RECENT APPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES LAWS
TO CONSERVE MARINE SPECIES WORLDWIDE:
SHOULD TRADE SANCTIONS BE MANDATORY?
John Alton Duff
I. INTRODUCTION
A quarter of a century ago, the U.S. Congress enacted one of the
first domestic laws aimed at enforcing marine species conservation
agreements beyond U.S. territorial limits, the Pelly Amendment.' That
amendment gave the President the authority and discretion to impose
trade sanctions on foreign nations as a means to gain compliance with
international fishery conservation agreements.2 Since the Pelly Amend-
ment's enactment in 1971, Congress has amended it and promulgated
other statutes aimed at conserving not only fish, but a wide array of
living marine resources such as whales, dolphins, sea turtles and other
wildlife threatened by commercial fishing practices.3
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1. Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 92-
219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994)).
2. Id. As enacted in 1971, the statute was limited to fishery conservation
agreements. In its present form the provision also applies to "program[s] for endangered
or threatened species." 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(2).
3. See Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994); Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment, and
Control Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-220, 101 Stat. 1477 (1987) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1822note (1994)); MarineMammalProtectionAct (NIMPA), 16U.S.C. §§ 1371-1407
(1994); Fishery ConservationAmendments of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 1826 (1994); HighSeas
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The most recent statutes require, rather than allow, the Executive
Branch to impose trade sanctions on nations deemed to be violating
marine resource protection pacts. In some cases, sanctions imposed on
foreign nations have resulted in bitter trade disputes, such as the tuna-
dolphin conflict that went before a General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade dispute resolution panel.4 Until recently, the Executive Branch
had been successful in limiting conflicts between international conserva-
tion and international trade objectives. However, the more recent and
less discretionary statutory requirements may impose difficult duties upon
members of the Executive Branch who are more comfortable with
flexible approaches to trade and foreign affairs issues.
This Article reviews the application of three United States statutes
which may trigger trade sanctions for violations of marine resource
conservation programs. Recently, three issues have arisen which
illustrate the range of enforcement measures that may be taken, the
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-582, 106 Stat. 4900 (1992)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826a-1826c (1994)); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. 101-162,
§ 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037 [hereinafter Section 609] (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537 note
(1994)).
4. Joel P. Trachtman, GAlWDispute Settlement Panel, International Decisions, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1992). Foreign nation tuna fishing practices that resulted in large
numbers of incidental dolphin deaths led the United States to impose trade restrictions
on States violating dolphin conservation measures as set out in the MMPA. Id. See also
John P. Manard, Jr., GATT and the Environment: The Friction Between International
Trade and the World's Environment-The Dolphin and Tuna Dispute, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
373 (1992); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Environment and Trade Measures After the Tuna!
Dolphin Decision, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1221 (1992); Dorothy J. Black, Note,
International Trade v. Environmental Protection: The Case of the U.S. Embargo on
Mexican Tuna, 24 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 123 (1992); Carol J. Beyers, Note, The
U.S./Mexico Tuna Embargo Dispute: A Case Study of the GATT and Environmental
Progress, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 229 (1992); Eric Christensen & Samantha Geff'm,
GAT Sets its Net on Environmental Regulation: The GATT Panel Ruling on Mexican
Yellowfin Tuna Imports and the Needfor Reform of the International Trading System, 23
U. MiAMIINTER-AM. L. REV. 569 (1991-92); RobertF. Housman& Durwood J. Zaelke,
The Collision of the Environment and Trade: The GAIT Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 22
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,268 (Apr. 1992); Matthew H. Hurlock, Note, The
GAIT, U.S. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the
Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 CoLuM. L. REv. 2098 (1992); David J. Ross, Note, Making
GAITDolphin-Safe: Trade and the Environment, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 349
(1992); Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United States Use of
Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and Other International
Marine Living Resources, 21 ECOL. L.Q. 1 (1994).
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circumstances under which they may be employed, the relative discretion
on the part of the Executive Branch in administering the laws, and the
repercussions that may result.
Part Two of this Article discusses the oldest U.S. domestic law used
to protect whale stocks worldwide, the Pelly Amendment. It outlines the
U.S. Secretary of Commerce's investigation of Japan's recent scientific
whaling efforts, the resulting certification of Japan under the Pelly
Amendment, and Japan's response to certification. It concludes by
underscoring the great discretion afforded the President in determining
whether or not to impose trade sanctions.
Part Three discusses the United States Court of International Trade's
December 1995 application of the Endangered Species Act's sea turtle
provision (Section 609).1 It outlines the Executive Branch's initial,
limited application of Section 609 to the wider Caribbean region. It then
examines the claim of environmental organizations that the law mandates
worldwide application. Part Three next summarizes the court's
determination that the law demands global application. It explains the
court's finding that Section 609 leaves little discretion to the Executive
Branch in imposing trade sanctions. The section concludes by noting
that free trade violation charges levied by affected nations could subject
U.S. imposed trade sanctions to an international dispute resolution
process.
Part Four reviews the March 1996 U.S. Court of International Trade
decision ordering the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to apply the trade
sanction provisions of the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act6
against Italy for driftnetting operations in contravention of a global
moratorium. It presents the concerns that led to a global moratorium on
the use of large scale driftnets on the high seas. It sets out the United
States High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act with its con-
gressionally-created worldwide enforcement mechanism, and explains
how that law reaches into the Mediterranean Sea to affect Italian fishing
practices. Part Four concludes by revisiting questions concerning the
need for, and authority of, the global moratorium. It also suggests that
a U.S. law that imposes its fishery conservation objectives on fishing in
the Mediterranean, an area over which other nations have potentially
exclusive fishery jurisdiction, merits review.
5. Section 609, supra note 3.
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826a-1826c (1994).
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Based on the three issues referred to above, this Article concludes
that the increase in statutorily mandated enforcement measures, at a time
when the United States is entering larger and more comprehensive trade
agreements, inevitably leads to an increasing likelihood of conflict
between free trade and marine species conservation goals. Fair trade and
sustainable use issues cannot be addressed when isolated from one
another. These recent developments indicate that U.S. policymaking in
both areas needs to be reviewed and integrated to achieve a mutually
acceptable and balanced practice that will be respected by other States
and will withstand the scrutiny of international arbiters.
II. JAPAN'S SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH WHALING AND
UNITED STATES APPLICATION OF THE PELLY AMENDMENT
A. International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling
Both the United States and Japan are States Parties to the Interna-
tional Convention on the Regulation of Whaling.7 The provisions of the
Convention are administered by the International Whaling Commission
(IWC). 8 In 1982, the IWC called for a moratorium on commercial
whaling.9 Pursuant to that resolution, a moratorium on commercial
whaling began in 1986 and remains in effect.1" While the moratorium
7. International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Dec. 2, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. See also 1 PATRICIA BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF WHALING, 168-204 (1985) (detailed analysis of ICRW).
8. ICRW, supra note 7, art. III.
9. See Kazuo Sumi, The "Whale War" Between Japan and the United States:
Problems and Prospects, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 317, 335 (1989) (quoting
Chairman's Report, Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 34th Mtg., para. 6 (1982)). In 1982, the
IWC amended paragraph 10 of its Schedule by adding the following language:
Notwithstanding the other provision of paragraph 10, catch limit for the killing
for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the
1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. This provision will be
kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 the
Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this
decision on whale stocks and consider modification of this provision and the
establishment of other catch limits.
Id. See also 2 PATRICIA BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING 714 (1985).
10. Schedule, Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 47th Mtg., para. 10(d), (e) (as amended
Sept. 1995) [hereinafter ICRW Schedule (1995)]. The moratorium on the commercial
taking of all whales including Minke whales is illustrated in this 1995 Schedule by Table
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has substantially reduced the number of whales taken annually," the IWC
does allow some whales to be killed each year under its scientific
"research whaling" provisions. 2
B. The Pelly Amendment
The Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act, 3 calls on
the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to "certify"' 4 nations whose actions are
found to diminish the effectiveness of international fishery conservation
and endangered species conservation programs. 5 The Pelly Amendment
gives the President great discretion in determining what, if any,
enforcement actions might be taken to persuade a foreign nation to
respect such agreements. 16  While certifications have been numerous,
1, Baleen Whale Stock Classifications and Catch Limits. Id. at tbl. 1. All commercial
catch limits are set at zero through 1997. Id.
11. Robert Friedheim, Moderation in the Pursuit of Justice: Erplaining Japan's
Failure in the International Whaling Negotiations (1995) (manuscript onfile with author).
The moratorium did not end commercial whaling. Besides the fact that whaling is
permitted by the "research whaling" provision, as discussed infra note 12, Norway and
Iceland, former States Parties to the ICRW, have left the IWC. Therefore they are no
longer legally bound by the Convention or the Commission's allocation schedule, and
have resumed commercial whaling. Id.
12. ICRW, supra note 7, at art. VIII. "[A]ny Contracting Government may grant
to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take, and treat
whales for purposes of scientific research ... " Id.
13. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994).
14. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(2) (1994). "Certification" refers to the action the
Secretary of Commerce takes in notifying the President that "nationals of a foreign
country, directly or indirectly, are engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the
effectiveness of any international program for endangered or threatened species." Id.
15. Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis
of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U.J. INr'L L. &
POL'Y, 751, 758-759 (1994). Originally, the Pelly Amendment applied only to
international fishery conservation programs. In 1978, it was amended to also apply to
international programs for endangered or threatened species. Id. at 758-760. See also
22 U.S.C. §§ 1978(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
16. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4) (1994).
Mhe President may direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the bringing or
the importation into the United States of any products from the offending country
for any duration as the President determines appropriate and to the extent that such
prohibition is sanctioned by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Id. (emphasis added).
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presidents normally decide not to impose trade sanctions.' 7  In some
instances, the mere threat of trade sanctions has been effective in gaining
compliance with marine conservation agreements.'8
C. United States Certification of Japan's Recent Whaling Activities
In recent years, Japan has issued permits allowing more than 300
whales to be taken annually for scientific research.' 9 This research
whaling has been criticized by some commentators as a continuation of
commercial whaling under the rubric of "scientific research."' Much
of Japan's research whaling takes place in the Southern Pacific.' In
1994, IWC member nations voted to establish a Southern Ocean
Sanctuary in an area of the southern hemisphere hosting large whale
populations.' The government of Japan lodged an objection to the
17. See Charnovitz, supra note 15, at 763-773 (reviewing the fourteen Pelly
certifications between 1971 and 1994, the one instance where trade sanctions were
announced, and concluding Pelly threats have a fifty-eight percent success rate).
18. Id. at 772-775.
19. U.S. Probes Japan's Whaling with Sanctions in View, Japan Transp. Scan,
Dec. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ZJP1 File.
20. Dean M. Wilkinson, The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce International
Whaling Agreements:A Critical Perspective, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 271, 277-279,
283 (1989). After the moratorium was in place, efforts to "exploit this [scientific
research] loophole became systematic." Id. at 277. Conservationists sought to "counter
the growing abuse of Article VIII of the Convention and the use of 'scientific research'
to cloak commercial whaling operations." Id. at 283.
21. See U.S. Probes Japan's Whaling, supra note 19.
22. ICRW Schedule (1995), supra note 10, para. 7(b).
In accordance with Article V(1)(c) of the Convention, commercial whaling,
whether by pelagic operations or from land stations, is prohibited in a region
designated as the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. This Sanctuary comprises the
waters of the Southern Hemisphere southwards of the following line: starting
from 40 degrees S, 50 degrees W; thence due east to 20 degrees E; thence due
south to 55 degrees S; thence due east to 130 degrees E; thence due north to
40 degrees S; thence due east to 130 degrees W; thence due south to 60
degrees S; thence due east to 50 degrees W; thence due north to the point of
beginning. This prohibition applies irrespective of the conservation status of
baleen and toothed whale stocks in this Sanctuary, as may from time to time
be determined by the Commission. However, this prohibition shall be
reviewed ten years after its initial adoption and at succeeding ten year intervals,
and could be revised at such times by the Commission.
Id. For all Contracting Governments except Japan, paragraph 7(b) came into force on
December 6, 1994. Id. para. 7(b) n.**.
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Southern Ocean Sanctuary resolution.23 Therefore, Japan is not legally
bound by the terms of the resolution.' Japan is also requesting a legal
determination on the IWC's authority to designate a Southern Ocean
Sanctuary.21
In 1995, States Parties to the ICRW voted to restrict scientific
research on whales to non-lethal methods in the Southern Ocean
Sanctuary.' The resolution also called on all States Parties to refrain
from issuing scientific permits for lethal research in the area.' Further,
IWC members reiterated and strengthened the provisions regarding
scientific whaling to emphasize that states should permit lethal research
only in exceptional circumstances.' Japan opted out of the resolutions
23. Id. para. 7(b) n.**.
24. Id.
25. Resolution on Legal Matters Related to the Adoption of the Southern Ocean
Sanctuary, Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 47th Mtg., Agenda Item 13, at IWC/47/45 (1995).
26. Resolution on Whaling Under Special Permit in Sanctuaries, IWC Resolution
1995-8, Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 47th Mtg. (1995). "Contracting Governments should
undertake, and collaborate in, the conduct of a programme of research in the Southern
Ocean Sanctuary using non-lethal methods." Id. See also Japan Harpoons Ban on
"Research" Whaling, Agence France Presse, June 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, APP File (noting that 23 of the 30 IWC member States voted to adopt non-lethal
scientific research methods).
27. Resolution on Whaling Under Special Permit in Sanctuaries, supra note 26.
"Contracting Governments should... refrain from issuing Special Permits for research
involving the killing of cetaceans in such sanctuaries." Id.
28. Resolution on Whaling Under Special Permit, IWC Resolution 1995-9, Int'l
Whaling Comm'n, 47th Mtg. (1995).
WHEREAS with the development of modem scientific techniques it is not
necessary to kill whales to obtain the information that is needed for initial
implementation of the Revised Management Procedure for a particular whale
stock;
NOW THEREFORE the Commission:
RECOMMENDS
-that scientific research intended to assist the comprehensive assessment
of whale stocks and the implementation of the Revised Management
Procedure shall be undertaken by non-lethal means;
-that scientific research involving the killing of cetaceans should only
be permitted in exceptional circumstances where the questions address
critically important issues which cannot be answered by the analysis of
existing data and/or use of non-lethal research techniques;
RECOMMENDS that Contracting Governments, in the exercise of their
sovereign rights, refrain from issuing or revoke, permits to its nationals that the
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and indicated that it would continue to pursue its research whaling.29
In Japan's last expedition prior to the 1986 moratorium on whaling,
Japan took approximately 2,000 minke whales? After the moratorium
became effective, Japan restricted its whaling to "scientific research" and
issued special permits for the lethal taking of approximately 300 minkes
per year.' In 1995, Japan announced that it would increase its scientific
whaling level to 440 for the 1995-1996 season. 2 Japan indicated that it
would not seek further increases for at least seven years.3
In light of the sanctuary and scientific research resolutions and
Japan's intent to increase its whaling efforts, the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce began an investigation to determine if Japan's actions would
diminish the effectiveness of the ICRW.' On December 11, 1995, in a
letter to the President, the Secretary of Commerce concluded that Japan's
disregard for the resolutions diminished the effectiveness of the IWC's
conservation efforts.35 Pursuant to the Pelly Amendment, the Secretary
certified Japan. 6 This certification started the sixty day review period
within which the President must determine whether trade sanctions or
other means should be used to address the issue. 7
Japan protested the certification, arguing that its research is legal
under the ICRW 8 Japan's First Secretary for Fisheries called the U.S.
Commission, taking into account the comments of its Scientific Committee,
considers do not satisfy the criteria specified above and therefore are not
consistent with the Commission's conservation policy.
Id. (emphasis added).
29. See Japan Harpoons Ban on "Research" Whaling, supra note 26.
30. Sumi, supra note 9, at 327.
31. Gene S. Martin, Jr. & James W. Brennan, Enforcing the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 293, 305 (1989).
32. U.S. Probes Japan's Whaling with Sanctions in View, supra note 19.
33. Id. (citing statement by U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service spokesman).
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also Brown Accuses Japan of Research Whaling, Jiji Press Ticker
Service, Dec. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, JIJI File (citing letter from
United States Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown to President Clinton). "Japanese
Nationals are engaged in scientific whaling activities that diminish the effectiveness of
the International Whaling Commission Conservation Program." Id.
36. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(2) (1994).
37. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(b) (1994).
38. Japan Defends Whale Hunts Under U.S. Attack, Reuters World Service, Dec.
20, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, REUWLD File.
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action, "a subjective assessment of the situation"39 and noted that the
increased scientific whaling effort was based on an 1WC science panel
determination that past research efforts were inadequate.4" However,
U.S. officials countered that the increase in lethal research was not
connected to the science panel's analysis.4 Environmental organi-
zations42 and some members of Congress urged sanctions.43
On February 9, 1996, President Clinton announced that he would not
impose trade sanctions against Japan.' The President expressed his
belief that the issue would be better addressed through other "high level
efforts to persuade Japan to reduce" its research whaling.4" Advocates
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Clinton Set to Decide Action on Japan Whaling, Reuters, Ltd., Feb. 8, 1996,
available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTLNE File.
43. Id. "At this point, any efforts short of sanctions would... signal a lack of
commitment to whale conservationby the United States." Id. (quoting Sen. JohnKerry).
44. Text of Presidential Statement on Int'l Whaling Commission, U.S. Newswire,
Feb. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, USNWR File.
45. Id.
On December 11, 1995, Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown certified under
[the Pelly Amendment] that Japan has conducted research whaling activities
that diminish the effectiveness of the International Whaling Commission (IWC)
conservation program ....
The certification of the Secretary of Commerce was based on Japanese
research whaling activities in both the North Pacific and the Southern Ocean
Whale Sanctuary. In 1994, Japan expanded its research whaling activities into
the North Pacific by permitting the taking of 100 minke whales, 21 of which
were taken. The IWC found that this North Pacific whaling failed to satisfy
applicable criteria for lethal research and was therefore inconsistent with the
IWC's conservation program. Nevertheless, Japan continued its whaling
activities in the North Pacific, taking 100 minke whales in 1995. In addition,
during 1995, Japan increased the number of minke whales to be harvested in
the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary by 33 percent, despite a 1994 finding by
the IWC that this lethal research program did not meet all applicable criteria.
In his letter to me of December 11, 1995, Secretary Brown conveyed his
concerns not only over the whales that have been killed in this program to date
but also over any further expansion of lethal research. While noting that the
Japanese have informed us they have no plans for further expansion of lethal
research in the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary, he expressed particular
concern over whaling activity in that area. I share these concerns.
At this stage, I do not believe that the use of trade sanctions is the most
constructive approach to resolving our differences over research whaling
activities with the Government of Japan. However, I have instructed the
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of marine conservation and whale protection took solace in the
President's statement that he would seek to resolve the issue before the
start of Japan's next Antarctic whaling season. 6
D. Analysis
The certification process of the Pelly Amendment illustrates a
flexible enforcement tool favored by the Executive Branch. While a
foreign nation's activities may warrant and even require investigation and
certification,47 trade sanctions are not required.48 As illustrated in this
instance, the President has the authority to seek other means to persuade
a foreign nation to comply with international conservation agreements.
Accordingly, the President can take into account other factors involved
in U.S. relations with that nation and "custom fit" a response. As a
result, trade sanctions are not used as a matter of practice.49
It is perhaps this restraint that has led Congress to enact laws which
mandate the imposition of sanctions for certain fishing practices which
threaten the conservation of marine species. Two recent cases before the
United States Court of International Trade illustrate the difficulties that
the Executive Branch is encountering as these action forcing laws are
employed for the first time.
Department of State to convey my very strong concerns to the Government of
Japan. We will also vigorously pursue high-level efforts to persuade Japan to
reduce the number of whales killed in its research program and act consistently
with the IWC conservation program. We hope to achieve significant progress
on these issues by the beginning of the next Antarctic whaling season and will
keep these issues under review. I have instructed the Department of
Commerce to continue to monitor closely Japan's research whaling and to
report promptly on any further inconsistencies between Japanese whaling
activities and the guidelines of the IWC conservation program.
Id.
46. S. Paul, U.S. Will Not Punish Japan for Continued Whaling, Reuters, Ltd.,
Feb. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTLNE File (statement of World
Wildlife Fund vice-president Richard Mott). See also Text of Presidential Statement,
supra note 44.
47. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(3) (1994).
48. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(4) (1994).
49. Charnovitz, supra note 15, at 759-760.
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III. UNITED STATES APPLICATION OF THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT SEA TURTLE PROTECTION PROVISION:
REGULATING SHRIMPING AROUND THE WORLD
On December 29, 1995, in Earth Island Institute v. Christopher,'
the United States Court of International Trade directed the United States
Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury ("federal defendants")
to apply sea turtle protection measures to all nations exporting shrimp to
the United States." Most species of sea turtle are considered endangered
or threatened.' Large numbers of them drown in shrimp nets around the
world. 3 In the United States, shrimping operators must employ Turtle
Excluder Devices to reduce the number of incidentally caught sea
turtles.' However, foreign shrimpers are not subject to similar
regulations.
Under a 1989 amendment to the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the
United States must ban shrimp imports from countries that fail to reduce
sea turtle fatalities in shrimping operations.55 However, before Earth
Island Institute v. Christopher, federal authorities had applied this pro-
vision only to those nations catching shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico and
wider Caribbean region. 6
A. Endangered Species Act Sea Turtle Protection Provision
(Section 609)
The ESA directs all federal departments and agencies to use their
authority to conserve endangered and threatened species. 7 Pursuant to
the ESA listing process, five species of sea turtles found in U.S. waters
are designated as endangered and one is designated threatened. 8
50. 913 F. Supp. 559 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
51. Id. at 580.
52. See infra note 58.
53. See infra note 59.
54. See infra note 62.
55. Section 609, supra note 3.
56. 56 Fed. Reg. 1051 (1991).
57. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
58. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1994). Green sea turtle (Chelonia mydas) - endangered
in some areas, threatened elsewhere; Hawksbill sea turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata) -
endangered; Kemp's (Atlantic) ridley sea turtle (Lepidochelys kempi) - endangered;
Leatherback sea turtle (Dermochelys coriacea) - endangered; Loggerhead sea turtle
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Commercial shrimp fishing has been identified as a primary threat to sea
turtles around the world. 9 In 1989, Congress amended the ESA by
adopting measures to reduce the threat to sea turtles within their
"geographic range of distribution."'
Most U.S. commercial shrimping activity takes place in the Gulf of
Mexico and wider Caribbean region including the western Atlantic."' In
the United States, commercial shrimping vessels operating in sea turtle
areas are required to use Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) on their nets
to allow turtles to escape.62 Since the introduction of TEDs, the turtle
mortality rate from U.S. commercial shrimping interactions has decreas-
ed dramatically.63 Most foreign shrimpers do not employ TEDs.64
The United States imports billions of dollars worth of shrimp
annually from over seventy nations.65 An estimated 124,000 sea turtles
drown each year due to shrimping practices by non-U.S. fleets. ' To
address this threat to the survival of the species, the ESA sea turtle
protection provision (known as "Section 609") directs the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce to, inter alia:
develop agreements with other nations for the conservation of
sea turtles;
initiate negotiations with foreign nations engaged in commercial
shrimping practices which might adversely affect these species;
encourage the protection of specific ocean and land regions vital
to the species' survival; and,
(Carretta carretta) - threatened; Olive (Pacific) ridley sea turtle (Lepidochelys olivacea)
- endangered in some areas, threatened elsewhere. Id.
59. WEBER ET AL., DELAY AND DENIAL-A POLICAL HISTORY OF SEA TURTLES
AND SHRIMP FISHING (1995).
60. Section 609, supra note 3.
61. See WEBER ET AL., supra note 59.
62. 57 Fed. Reg. 57,348 (1992) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 217 and 227).
63. See WEBER ET AL., supra note 59.
64. See infra note 110.
65. Judge Says Law to Save Turtles Prevents Most Imports of Shrimp, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1996, at A9.
66. Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. at 568 (citing affidavit of
Todd Steiner).
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provide Congress with a list of nations which conduct commer-
cial shrimping operations within the range of those sea turtles
and indicate which nation's operation may adversely affect
them. 67
Section 609 also includes enforcement measures to reduce the global
threat to sea turtles. Specifically, it requires that "[t]he importation of
shrimp or products from shrimp which have been harvested with
commercial fishing technology which may affect adversely such species
of sea turtles shall be prohibited," unless the government of the
harvesting nation can prove that it has adopted a regulatory program to
reduce sea turtle deaths which is comparable to that of the United
States.
B. Foreign Shrimping and United States Application of Section 609
Concerned that the application of Section 609 to all nations might
adversely affect trade, the State Department directed its efforts toward
those nations which operate in the Gulf of Mexico and wider Caribbean
region.69 This region hosts most of the U.S. shrimping industry and is
considered an important sea turtle habitat.7' In construing Section 609
in this manner, the State Department applied the sea turtle protection
measures to only fourteen of the more than eighty-five countries that
export shrimp to the United States.7 Of the top seven shrimp exporters
to the United States, only Mexico fell within the State Department's
application of Section 609.
67. Section 609, supra note 3.
68. Id. § 609(b) (emphasis added).
69. Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations Protection; Guidelines 56 Fed.
Reg. 1051 (1991); see also Kathleen D. Yaninek, Turtle Excluder Device Regulations:
Laws Sea Turtles Can Live With, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 256, 293-294 (1995) [hereinafter
Yaninek].
70. See WEBER ET AL., supra note 59.
71. See Yaninek, supra note 69, at 283.
72. See Yaninek, supra note 69, at 294.
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C. Where Does Section 609 Apply? Earth Island Institute v. Christopher
In Earth Island Institute v. Christopher,7 environmental organiza-
tions argued that the Departments of State and Commerce had improperly
limited application of Section 609 to the wider Caribbean.74 The
environmental organizations read Section 609 to apply globally. 5 They
pointed to commercial shrimp fishing operations as a "major factor in the
mortality and decimation of these species."16 The plaintiffs argued that
the State Department's limiting interpretation rendered part of Section
609 "inoperative and meaningless. " The federal defendants argued that
the environmental organizations lacked standing." In addition, the
federal defendants asserted that their interpretation of Section 609 was
reasonable.79
The intervenor-defendant in the case, the National Fisheries
Institute, Inc., also raised the specter of a challenge to U.S. free trade
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).'
Unlike the Pelly Amendment, Section 609 does not include a GATT
consistency clause in its trade sanction provisions.8 This fact, coupled
with the lack of discretion under the Pelly Amendment, might lead to
unwanted trade disputes with foreign nations. Given that two GATT
panels had found analogous provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection
Act to violate GATT, the intervenors argued that "there are very serious
questions relating to the consistency of [Section 609] with U.S. GATT
obligations. "'
73. 913 F. Supp. 559 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
74. Id. at 567.
75. Id. at 569.
76. Environmental Group Sues Government On Failure to Ban Certain Shrimp
Imports, BNA Int'l Trade Daily, Mar. 4, 1992, available in Westlaw, BNA-BTD
Database.
77. Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. at 578 (quoting Plaintiffs'
Reply and Opposition Memorandum, p. 21).
78. Id. at 564.
79. Id. at 574-77.
80. Id. at 559-579.
81. See 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4) (1994).
82. Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. at 579.
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1. Standing
The federal defendants argued that the environmental organizations
did not have a sufficient interest in the issue to constitute legal standing."
They relied on the Supreme Court ruling in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,' where the Court reiterated the requisite elements of standing.
A party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish that it has suffered
injury in fact, that there is a causal connection between that injury and
the conduct complained of, and that the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision.' In Lujan, the Supreme Court held that an
environmental organization did not present a sufficient "injury in fact"
when it made the general argument that a government interpretation of
the ESA might result in an increase in the rate of extinction of endan-
gered and threatened species. s6
The Trade Court distinguished the instant case from the facts in
Defenders of Wildlife, pointing out that here; plaintiffs had supported
their claim of injury in fact with sufficient specificity and credibility.'
The Trade Court noted that the type of injury claimed by the plaintiffs
had been foreseen and deemed sufficient by the Supreme Court in
Defenders of Widlife: "[T]he desire to use or observe an animal species,
even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for
purpose of standing."'
2. Interpretation of Section 609
The Trade Court noted that the main issue of the case at hand was
whether the Departments of State and Commerce had properly applied
Section 609 in limiting its application to nations that were conducting
commercial shrimping operations in the Caribbean region. 9 The State
Department had interpreted Section 609 "to be limited to an effort by the
Congress to extend the protection given to threatened and endangered sea
turtles protected by U.S. regulations only to those turtles throughout their
83. Id. at 564.
84. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
85. Id. at 560.
86. Id. at 562.
87. Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. at 567-568.
88. Id. at 567 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-563).
89. Id. at 575.
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range across the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, and western central Atlantic
(or, more simply, the wider Caribbean)."'
In construing Section 609 in this manner, the federal defendants
applied the sea turtle protection provision only to the fleets of those
nations operating in the wider Caribbean region and exporting shrimp to
the United States.9' They argued that, since Section 609(b) is silent
regarding geographic scope of implementation, they had reasonably
limited its scope to the wider Caribbean.' Arguing in the alternative,
the federal defendants contended that even if Section 609 had originally
been enacted to cover all sea turtle-shrimping interactions, Congress had
acquiesced to the Department of State's interpretation of the statute by
remaining silent regarding its application.'
The Trade Court began its analysis by noting that, "[t]he starting
point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself ... [and i]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question of the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute."' The federal
defendants argued that they had interpreted Section 609 in a permissible
manner.' The court disagreed, pointing out that no ambiguity existed
which might support their interpretation.' In addition, the court
indicated that the statute contained no terms of geographic restriction.'
Furthermore, the court did not find the statute silent on the matter, since
it was global in its reference to "all foreign governments which are
engaged in, or which have persons or companies engaged in, commercial
fishing operations which ... may affect adversely [endangered or
threatened] species of sea turtles.""
90. Id. at 577.
91. Id. at 574-575 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. at 9015-9016 (1993)); see also Yaninek,
supra note 69, at 294.
92. Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. at 559, 576-577.
93. Id. at 577.
94. Id. at 575 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
95. Id. at 576-577.
96. Id. at 577-578.
97. Id. at 575.
98. Id. (quoting Section 609(a)(2) (emphasis added)).
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3. Congressional Acquiescence Argument
The Trade Court rejected the federal defendants' argument that
Congress had effectively acquiesced to the limited geographic scope
interpretation.'3 The court noted that judicial determination of congres-
sional acquiescence is limited to cases in which there has been "extend-
ed, meaningfal interaction between the executive and legislative
branches" and where the Congress has revisited the statute and left the
practice untouched."3 In the case at hand, the federal defendants'
interpretation had existed for a short period of time and Congress had not
revisited Section 609 or even been asked to do so by the Executive
Branch since its enactment.'
4. GATT Concerns
In applying Section 609, the Trade Court acknowledged that it must
attempt to interpret domestic legislation in a manner that does not require
the United States to violate its international obligations.' However, in
addressing the federal defendants' claim that a mandate to impose trade
sanctions might result in international trade disputes, the Trade Court
noted that enforcement of Section 609 had not yet raised any "troubling
tensions" with foreign governments previously affected by the trade
sanction provisions.0 3
5. Holding and Relief Granted
Upon reviewing the issues and arguments of the parties, the Trade
Court held that "the purview of Section 609 is clear on its face and not
susceptible to differing interpretations; it is devoid of words or terms of
geographical limitation."' ° The court cited the plain language of the
ESA as applicable to all nations exporting shrimp to the United States. 0 5
99. Id. at 577.
100. Id. (distinguishing facts at hand from those in defendants' supporting case,
Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974)).
101. Id. at 577.
102. Id. at 579 n.39 (citing Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America v.
United States, 852 F. Supp. 1078 (1994)).
103. Id. at 579.
104. Id. at 578.
105. Id. at 575 (citing Section 609(a)(2)).
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Accordingly, the court held that, "the [federal] defendants are not
properly enforcing the above-quoted section 609(b) by restricting its
mandate to the Gulf of Mexico-Caribbean Sea-western Atlantic
Ocean. ""o
At the outset of its opinion, the Trade Court noted that, "[s]cience
and government have apparently come to agree that the turtles which
have navigated Earth's oceans for millions of years may not survive
modern human habits (and appetites) without the intervention of law.""
The court directed the federal departments and agencies to "prohibit not
later than May 1, 1996 the importation of shrimp ... wherever
harvested in the wild with commercial fishing technology" unless the
exporting state adopts sea turtle conservation measures."° The order
directed the Executive Departments to report the results of their actions
to the Trade Court by May 31, 1996."°
D. Immediate Effects of the Earth Island Case
In February 1996, the State Department issued a preliminary list of
over fifty nations and territories that could be subject to a shrimp
embargo.11° A coalition of the listed countries brought a complaint
106. Id. at 580.
107. Id. at 561.
108. Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. State Department Identifies Nations Potentially Subject to Shrimp Embargo, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 340 (Feb. 28, 1996). In addition to Mexico, the preliminary list
identifies these countries:
Central America: Honduras, Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica and Belize;
Caribbean and South America: Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia,
Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname, French Guiana;
Europe: Italy, Portugal, and Spain;
Middle East: Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Turkey;
South Asia: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka;
Southeast Asia: Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia,
Burma, Vietnam;
East Asia: China, Taiwan, Macao, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong;
Oceania: New Zealand, Australia, French Polynesia; and
Africa: Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Tunisia, Mozambique, Gabon,
Madagascar, South Africa.
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against the United States before the World Trade Organization (WTO).' 1'
They argued that the embargo provision amounts to an unfair trade
barrier." A U.S. delegate responded that the potential shrimp ban was
not protectionist." In accordance with the Trade Court's order, the
State Department identified the nations subject to possible embargoes."
Additionally, the federal defendants sought leave from the court for
a one year extension of time to enforce the sea turtle protection provision
of the ESA. However, on April 10, 1996, the Trade Court denied any
extension. While the Trade Court honored the request to hold an
expeditious hearing on the matter, they ultimately denied the govern-
ment's motion."' Thus the Trade Court's May 1, 1996 deadline
remained firm. As a result, the State Department issued revised
guidelines for determining whether a foreign nation has a "comparable"
regulatory program for protecting sea turtles.
11 6
111. U.S. Ruling on Possible Embargo of Some Shrimp is Attacked in WTO, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 475 (Mar. 20, 1996) (citing statement by representative of the
Philippines on behalf of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)). The
complaintwas alsojoinedby India, Hong Kong, Mexico, Australia, Venezuela, Pakistan,
and South Korea. Id. The ASEAN countries said in a statement that they considered
the U.S. action to be incompatible with Washington's WTO obligations. "We, just like
the U.S., are also cognizant of the need to protect sea turtles as they are not only a
natural heritage but also of economic importance, and, in fact, we have our own
conservationprograms," the ASEAN statement said. "To impose a program comparable
to that of the U.S. program be used by shrimp exporters raises the question of extra
territorial jurisdiction." The ASEAN statement compared the U.S. action with a pre-
vious U.S. ban on tuna imports which led to a GATT dispute. Id.
112. See id.; see also Thai Official Calls U.S. Turtle Law"Enforcement Unfair,
Xinhua News Agency, Apr. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, XINHUA
File; India Plans to Challenge U.S. Decision on Shrimp, J. CoM., Mar. 27, 1996, at A5.
113. U.S. Ruling on Possible Embargo of Some Shrimp is Attacked in WTO, supra
note 111. In reply to the protests by ASEAN, U.S. delegate Andrew Stoler rejected
charges voiced by Mexico that the shrimp ban was protectionist. Id.
114. State Department Identifies Nations Potentially Subject to Shrimp Embargo,
supra note 110 (citing a United States Department of Justice attorney's statement that an
appeal had been filed).
115. Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, No. 94-06-00321, 1996 Ct. Int'l Trade
LEXIS 71 (Ct. Int'l Trade Apr. 10, 1996).
116. 61 Fed. Reg. 17,342 (1996). These revised guidelines were designed
specifically for the protection of turtles in shrimp trawl fishing operations.
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E. Analysis
The Earth Island case illustrates the increasing difficulty that the
three branches of government face in reconciling trade and conservation
objectives. Congress enacted Section 609, giving the Executive Branch
little discretion in fashioning responses to shrimping practices of foreign
nations. In attempting to "fit" the law into its foreign affairs practice,
the Executive Branch runs afoul of the law's mandatory language. As
a result, the Trade Court is called upon to resolve the matter. But the
Trade Court must also attempt to strike a balance between its adjudica-
tion of domestic law and its obligation to do so in a manner that does not
result in U.S. violations of international law. In Earth Island, the court
walked a fine line in concluding that the United States must apply trade
sanction provisions against certain foreign nations. While the Trade
Court noted that the prior, geographically limited application of Section
609 had not created "troubling tensions" with foreign nations, the
international legal challenges following the court's decision prove that
such tensions are quite real.
IV. HIGH SEAS DRIFTNET FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT ACT:
UNITED STATES ENFORCEMENT REACHES INTO MEDITERRANEAN
On March 18, 1996, the U.S. Court of International Trade ordered
the Secretary of Commerce to "identify" Italy under the High Seas
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act," 7 paving the way for trade
sanctions... against Italy if its citizens or fishing vessels continued to use
large scale driftnets on the high seas." 9 In the underlying case, Humane
Society of the United States v. Brown,2° environmental organizations
117. High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act (Driftnet Enforcement Act), 16
U.S.C. § 1826a-1826c (1994). "[Whenever the Secretary of Commerce has reason to
believe that the nationals or vessels of any nation are conducting large-scale driftnet
fishing beyond the exclusive economic zone of any nation, the Secretary of Commerce
shall . . . identify that nation; and . . . notify the President and that nation of the
identification .... ." 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(1)(B) (1994).
118. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a (1994). Identification under § 1826a(b)(1)(B) sets the stage
for consultations and possible trade sanctions including import restrictions of fish and fish
products from the offending nations. Id.
119. Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) v. Brown, No. 95-05-00631,
1996 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 66 (Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 15, 1996) (judgment).
120. Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) v. Brown, 920 F. Supp. 178
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argued that the United States Departments of Commerce and State had
failed to apply the driftnet enforcement law." The aim of the law is to
enforce a global moratorium on a fishing practice that is perceived to be
needlessly wasteful and deadly to a wide array of non-target marine
species." Millions of dollars worth of Italian exports to the United
States lie in the balance."z
A. Driftnets and Marine Life
Driftnet fishing entails the use of long panels of almost invisible
monofilament netting which is placed in the water and left to drift to
entangle and catch large amounts of fish.1" Driftnets do not discriminate
between target species and other marine species.'' As a result, bycatch,
including non-target fish species, whales, dolphins, sea turtles and
seabirds, become entangled in the nets and die."16
The increase in the use of driftnets in the north Pacific Ocean led to
the enactment of the Driftnet Impact, Monitoring and Assessment, and
Control Act of 1987 (Driftnet Impact Act).' Congress intended for this
law to serve as a means to address the adverse impacts of driftnet fishing
on U.S. resources." Since most of the driftnet activity was taking place
on the high seas, outside U.S. jurisdiction, the Driftnet Impact Act called
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (trial on the merits).
121. Id.
122. See H.R. REP. No. 262, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1992) reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4090 [hereinafter Legislative History]; But cf. Burke et al., United
Nations Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing: An Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and
Coastal Fisheries Management, 25 OCEANDEv. & INT'L L. 127 (1994) (critical analysis
of United Nations high seas driftnet moratorium and United States driftnet enforcement
laws).
123. EU Concerned Over U.S. Court Ruling on Italian Driftnets, European Rep.,
Mar. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, EURRPT File.
124. H.R. REP. No. 262, supra note 122, at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4090-4091.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Pub. L. 100-220, Title IV, §§ 4001-4009, 101 Stat. 1477 (codified as
Driftnet Impact, Monitoring and Assessment, and Control Act at 16 U.S.C. § 1822 note
(1994)).
128. Id. § 4004. The Act focuses on anadramous fish stocks which the United
States considers "marine resources of the United States" even when found in waters
beyond the United States exclusive economic zone. Id. § 4003(5).
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on the Secretary of Commerce to negotiate monitoring agreements with
nations conducting large scale driftnet fishing in the North Pacific
Ocean.'2 9  The United States entered into agreements with Japan,
Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, " and China as a result.' Additionally,
the United States helped draft an international agreement to prohibit the
use of long driftnets in the South Pacific.
High seas driftnet fishing was not limited to the Pacific Ocean. In
1989, the United Nations General Assembly raised the concern that this
method of fishing "is widely considered to threaten the effective
conservation of living marine resources . . . [and] that more than one
thousand fishing vessels use large-scale driftnets in the Pacific, Atlantic
129. Id. § 4004.
The Secretary, through the Secretary of State and in consultation with the
Secretary of the Interior, shall immediately initiate, negotiations with each
foreign government that conducts, or authorizes its nationals to conduct,
driftnet fishing that results in the taking of marine resources of the United
States in waters of the North Pacific Ocean outside of the exclusive economic
zone and territorial sea of any nation, for the purpose of entering into
agreements for statistically reliable cooperative monitoring and assessment of
the numbers of marine resources of the United States killed and retrieved,
discarded, or lost by the foreign government's driftnet fishing vessels.
Id. § 4004(a) (emphasis added).
130. See H.R. REP. No. 262, supra note 122, at5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4091-4092 (referring to agreements with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea). See also
Charnovitz, supra note 15, at 765-768. In 1989, the United States Secretary of
Commerce certified Taiwan and South Korea under the Pelly Amendment for failing to
enter into driftnetting agreements. Both nations subsequently agreed to enter into
agreements. In 1991, the United States certified both nations under the Pelly
Amendment for failing to adhere to their respective agreements with the United States.
Trade sanctions were never imposed. Id.
131. Current Issues in International Fishery Conservation and Management,
Department of State Dispatch, Feb. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
ASAPII File. In a January 25, 1995 statement before the Subcommittee on Fisheries,
Wildlife, and Oceans of the House Committee on Resources, David A. Colson, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International and Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, noted the conclusion of a driftnet restriction agreement with the
People's Republic of China. Id.
132. See Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South
Pacific (Wellington Convention), Nov. 24, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 1449 (1990). See also
Martin A. Rogoff, The Obligation to Negotiate in International Law: Rules andRealities,
16 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 141, 176, n.140 (1994). The Convention entered into force on
May 17, 1991. Id.
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and Indian Oceans and in other areas of the high seas."'" While some
commentators question the scientific basis supporting a driftnet ban,"3 a
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution called on States to
adopt a moratorium on high seas driftnet use to be imposed by June 30,
1992.' This UNGA resolution prompted Congress to expand the scope
of the 1987 Driftnet Impact Act by passing the Driftnet Act Amendments
of 1990.136 The 1990 Amendments express the intent of the United
States to implement the United Nations moratorium resolution.137
B. The High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act
In 1990 and 1991, the United Nations called for renewed and
expanded efforts to stop driftnet fishing." s In response, the United
133. Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine
Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, 44 U.N. GAOR, 85th Plenary Mtg., U.N.
Doe. A/Res/44/225 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 UN Resolution].
4. (a) Moratoria should be imposed on all large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing
by 30 June 1992, with the understanding that such a measure will not be
imposed in a region or, if implemented, can be lifted, should effective
conservation and managementmeasures be takenbased upon statistically sound
analysis to be jointly made by concerned parties of the international community
with an interest in the fishery resources of the region, to prevent unacceptable
impact of such fishing practices on that region and to ensure the conservation
of the living marine resources of that region ....
Id.
134. See Burke et al., supra note 122 (citing scientific questions over need for high
seas driftnet ban and questioning legal authority of a United Nations General Assembly
moratorium resolution).
135. See 1989 UN Resolution, supra note 133.
136. Pub. L. No. 101-627, Title I, § 107(a) 104 Stat. 441 (1990) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1826 (1994)).
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1826(c) (1994).
It is declared to be the policy of the Congress in this section that the United
States should-
(1) implement the moratorium called for by the United Nations General
Assembly in Resolution Numbered 44-225;
(2) support the Tarawa Declaration and the Wellington Convention for the
Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific; and
(3) secure a permanent ban on the use of destructive fishing practices, and
in particular large-scale driftnets, by persons or vessels fishing beyond the
exclusive economic zone of any nation.
Id. (emphasis added).
138. See 45 U.N. GAOR, 71st Plenary Mtg., U.N. Doe. A/Res/45/197, para. 2
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States enacted the Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act. 139 The Driftnet
Enforcement Act requires the Secretary of Commerce to identify each
nation whose citizens or vessels are conducting large-scale driftnet
fishing on the high seas. 140 The Secretary of Commerce must then notify
the President and that nation of such identification.141 This "identifica-
tion" 42 begins the ninety-day period within which the identified nation
must cease using driftnets on the high seas. 4 3 Upon identification, the
President must consult with that nation in an effort to obtain an
agreement that the nation will immediately terminate driftnet fishing by
its citizens or vessels.'" In the event that such an agreement is not
reached within ninety days, the President must instruct the Secretary of
the Treasury to restrict the import of that nation's fish, fish products, and
sport fishing products. "' The Driftnet Enforcement Act gives virtually
no discretion to the Executive Branch in the application of trade
restrictions. 146
Various Executive Branch departments and agencies were aware that
certain nations including Italy had been using large-scale driftnets in high
(1990). Wherein the United Nations General Assembly:
Reaffirms its resolution 44/225, and calls for its full implementation by all
members of the international community, in accordance with the measures and
time-frame elaborated in paragraph 4 of that resolution concerning large-scale
pelagic driftnet fishing on the high seas of all the world's oceans and seas,
including enclosed and semi-enclosed seas ...
Id. See also 46 U.N. GAOR, 79th Plenary Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res. 46/215, para. 3
(1991). Wherein the United Nations General Assembly:
Calls upon all members of the international community to implement
resolutions 44/225 and 5/197 by, inter alia, taking the following actions: ...
(c) Ensure that a global moratorium on all large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing
is fully implemented on the high seas of the world's oceans and seas, including
enclosed seas and semi-enclosed seas, by 31 December 1992 ....
Id.
139. Driftnet Enforcement Act, supra note 117.
140. 16 U.S.C. 1826a(b) (1994); The "high seas" are those ocean areas beyond the
exclusive economic zone of any nation. United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, openedforsignature Dec. 10, 1982, Art. 86, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted
in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
141. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(1) (1994).
142. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b) (1994).
143. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(3)(A)(ii) (1994).
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(2) (1994).
145. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(3)(A) (1994).
146. See supra notes 140-145.
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seas areas. 147 Although Congress had enacted a seemingly straightfor-
ward and objective Driftnet Enforcement Act, the Executive Branch
refrained from applying it, noting that it could not sufficiently identify
any nation in violation of the driftnet moratorium. Environmental
organizations, frustrated by the Executive Branch's restraint, brought suit
to have them apply the enforcement provisions of the Act.
C. Reaching into the Mediterranean:
Humane Society of the United States v. Brown
1. Humane Society Preliminary Injunction Suit
In 1995, the Humane Society of the United States (ISUS) and other
environmental organizations provided the U.S. Departments of
Commerce and State with information regarding Italy's use of driftnets
in high seas areas.' The environmental organizations urged the
Secretary of Commerce to identify Italy pursuant to the Driftnet
Enforcement Act. 49 The Secretary refrained from doing so."
As a result, HSUS brought an action in the United States Court of
International Trade (Trade Court) alleging the Commerce Secretary's
inaction violated the mandate of the Driftnet Enforcement Act.151 The
environmental organizations sought declaratory relief and an immediate
writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of Commerce to identify
Italy.152
This was the first time that the Driftnet Enforcement Act would be
reviewed, interpreted, and applied by the Trade Court. 53  The
Departments of Commerce and State argued that the Driftnet Enforce-
ment Act did not provide for citizen suits, and that further, the Act
147. See Current Issues in International Fishery Conservation and Management,
supra note 131 (referring to reports that some European countries were ignoring the
moratorium and using driftnets in high seas areas of the Northeast Atlantic and in the
Mediterranean).
148. Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. 338,
345 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (preliminary injunction suit) (citing plaintiff's complaint at
para. 47).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 901 F. Supp. at 346.
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should be read to allow discretion in the Executive Branch." Finally,
they argued that their earlier forbearance from applying the Act was not
now subject to judicial review because there had been no final agency
action. I"
2. Of Standing, Citizens Suits, and Agency Actions
The Trade Court assessed the parties' contentions and refused to hold
that the plaintiffs were incapable of establishing standing.'56 The court
noted that, for the purposes of standing, at that point, they had
demonstrated a legally sufficient injury in fact from Italy's fishing
practices and the Commerce Department's failure to take measures to
stop those practices. 157
Responding to the federal agencies' argument that the Driftnet
Enforcement Act did not contain an explicit opportunity for a citizen's
suit, the Trade Court cited numerous Supreme Court decisions support-
ing the principle that "judicial review of a agency action 'is available [to
citizens] absent some clear and convincing evidence of legislative
intention to preclude review.'""' Further, the Trade Court reminded the
federal defendants that an agency action subject to judicial review, may
include a "failure to act.""' While the Trade Court ultimately held that
the plaintiffs failed to meet the high burden required to warrant a
preliminary injunction and immediate writ of mandamus, it did order an
expeditious hearing on the merits."'°
3. HSUS Trial on the Merits
In the hearing on the merits, the Trade Court noted that the action
could be resolved upon a determination of two issues:
154. Id. passim.
155. Id. at 347.
156. Id. at 347-348.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 349 (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S.
221, 230 n.4 (1986); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
410 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)).
159. HSUS v. Brown, 901 F. Supp. at 349 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 701(a)(2)
(1994)).
160. Id.
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1) whether or not there is reason to believe that nationals or
vessels of Italy are conducting large-scale driftnet fishing
beyond the exclusive economic zone of any nation and 2)
whether or not the plaintiffs have the requisite standing... to
obtain a declaration adjudging defendant Brown in violation of
[the Driftnet Enforcement Act identification provision] .... 161
The Driftnet Enforcement Act requires the Secretary of Commerce
to "identify each nation whose nationals or vessels that are conducting
large-scale driftnet fishing beyond the exclusive economic zone of any
nation .... 162 If, within a ninety day consultation period, the offend-
ing nation does not ensure the cessation of its high seas driftnetting, trade
sanctions must be imposed." The plaintiffs argued that the Departments
of Commerce and State ignored overwhelming evidence that Italy's
vessels were driftnetting on the high seas." Both Departments
acknowledged the existence of some driftnet activity but they deemed it
insufficient to trigger the application of the Enforcement Act. 1" The
Trade Court sided with the plaintiffs and held that Italy's activities rose
to such a level as to require a finding that they were acting in contraven-
tion of the U.N. moratorium and U.S. enforcement standards." In the
face of clear evidence, the Trade Court held that the Secretary of
Commerce was required by the statute to "identify" Italy."6 The court
did not recognize any congressional intent in the statute that might be
read as giving the Commerce Department discretion in the identification
process. "
161. Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) v. Brown, 920 F. Supp. 178,
181-182 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
162. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(1)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
163. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(3) (1994). The trade sanctions include prohibition on
imports of fish and fish products and sport fishing equipment from the offending nation.
Id. Further, if these sanctions are determined by the Secretary of Commerce to be
ineffective, that nation will be certified under the Pelly Amendment and the President
may impose a broader range of trade sanctions. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(4).
164. HSUS v. Brown, 920 F. Supp. 178, passim. (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
165. Id. at 191-192.
166. Id. at *43. The evidence was found to give "reason in the mind of an
ordinarily intelligent person to believe that Italians continue to engage in large-scale
driftnet fishing in the Mediterranean Sea in defiance of the law of their own country and
of the rest of the world.. .. " Id.
167. Id. at 195.
168. Id. at 192. While "maintenance of the best possible foreign relations may
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Accordingly, on March 18, 1996, the Trade Court ordered the
Secretary of Commerce to: "(i) identify Italy as a nation for which there
is reason to believe that its nationals or vessels are conducting large-scale
driftnet fishing beyond the exclusive economic zone of any nation and (ii)
notify the President of the United States and the nation of Italy of this
identification."169 Pursuant to the order, on March 28, 1996, the Secre-
tary of Commerce identified Italy as a nation conducting large-scale
driftnet fishing on the high seas.1 ° He also recommended that the
Department of State promptly notify Italy of the identification.' Some
commentators indicated that the application of the Driftnet Enforcement
Act might trigger a trade war.' However, the Department of Com-
merce noted that Italy's response to the identification was cooperative.173
commend [it] ...the statute under review does not [provide] it." Id.
169. HSUS v. Brown, No. 95-05-00631, 1996 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 66 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Mar. 15, 1996) (judgment).
170. Letter from U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown to the President of the
United States (Mar. 28, 1996) (on file with author).
I have been ordered by the United States Court of International Trade . . . to
identify Italy, pursuant to the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act
...as a nation for which there is reason to believe that its nationals or vessels
are conducting large-scale driftnet fishing beyond the exclusive economic zone
of any nation. By this letter, I am so identifying Italy.
The High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act requires you to enter
into consultations with the Government of Italy no later than 30 days from the
date of this identification for the purpose of obtaining an agreement that will
effect the immediate termination of large-scale driftnet fishing by Italian
nationals or vessels on the high seas. I have notified the Secretaries of State
and Treasury ... of this identification. I have also recommended that the
Department of State promptly notify the Government of Italy of my action and
its significance.
Id.
171. Id.
172. U.S. Government Faced with Tough Decision on Italian Fishing Case,
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Mar. 14, 1.996, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library,
CURNWS File.
173. Commerce Department Says Response Positive from Italy on Driftnets, U.S.
Department of Commerce News, Press Release NOAA 96-19 (March 29, 1996).
"Already our contact with the Italian government on this issue has been
positive and constructive," said Will Martin, Commerce's deputy assistant
secretary for international affairs at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. "Italian government officials have advised us formally that
they are prepared to take the appropriate steps both to strengthen their laws and
improve their enforcement of the laws. We believe this is a very constructive
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D. Analysis
The application of the Driftnet Enforcement Act raises important
political questions regarding the authority to conduct foreign affairs. The
Trade Court in this case, has deemed the Driftnet Enforcement Act to be
a Congressional grant of international relations power. As such, the
Trade Court recognizes the Act's mandatory application by the Executive
Branch. This effectively eliminates the discretion of the Secretary of
Commerce and the President in determining whether trade sanctions
should be imposed. However, the President may have an opportunity to
refrain from imposing sanctions, if a satisfactory agreement with the
offending nation seems likely.'74 In this case, Italian officials have not
challenged the U.S. action. Rather, they have immediately acknowl-
edged the concerns raised and have admitted that they have had
difficulties in regulating their own fishermen. They have stated that they
wish to resolve the issue in time to prevent sanctions.' Italy's
cooperation and forthright expressions could lead the Executive Branch
to more readily recognize a valid "agreement" that would avert the
imposition of sanctions.
If no satisfactory agreement on the cessation of Italy's driftnetting
can be reached, the Executive Branch will have no choice but to place
an embargo on certain Italian imports to the United States. If that
occurs, Italy may be forced into arguing that the United States High Seas
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act is an improper extension of
prescriptive jurisdiction.
The driftnet activities cited in this case took place in waters of the
Mediterranean-deemed high seas. However, the locations referred to in
the case were within 30 miles of various Mediterranean States' coasts.
But for the restraint of larger Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims,
first step. Based upon the initial response, we are confident that we can work
out an agreement to take the necessary steps to end use of the banned driftnets
by Italian fishermen."
Id.
174. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a(b)(3)(A) (1994). "The President ... if the consultations
... are not satisfactorily concluded within ninety days, shall direct the Secretary of the
Treasury to [impose trade sanctions]." Id. (emphasis added).
175. Thomas W. Lippman, Italy Faces Import Ban in U.S. OverNet Fishing, INT'L
HERALD TRiB., Mar. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, CURNWS File.
Italy indicated that it was making efforts to stop the driftnetting in the Mediterranean, but
that it was having difficulty policing what it referred to as Mafia-influenced fishing. Id.
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the U.S. law would not apply. This raises certain questions regarding
prescriptive jurisdiction in areas that are potentially within the exclusive
fisheries jurisdiction of coastal states. If those states have refrained from
claiming extensive EEZs for other reasons, e.g., to prevent boundary
disputes, should a distant third party State reach into that area and
subject it to laws which could not apply but for the coastal states'
restraint? Application of U.S. law in the latent EEZs of Mediterranean
States could effectively force those States to claim the area.
V. CONCLUSION
The Executive Branch of the U.S. government has been increasingly
pressed to employ the full measure of trade restrictions in instances
where foreign nations fail to comply with international marine species
conservation efforts. Congressional mandates, and the Judiciary's appli-
cation of them, have narrowed the Executive's permissible range of
responses.
Under the Pelly Amendment, the Executive Branch retains ultimate
authority in deciding whether United States market access will be used
to leverage compliance from foreign nations. The Pelly Amendment's
GATT-consistency provision further ensures that any trade restrictions
imposed will not run afoul of U.S. free trade obligations. However, the
Executive's hesitancy to actually use the Pelly Amendment to impose
trade sanctions may be the reason Congress has enacted statutes more
mandatory in nature.
Recent trade sanction laws, such as those found in the ESA (Section
609) and the Driftnet Enforcement Act, illustrate the shift in authority
away from the Executive Branch and back to Congress. These statutes
direct rather than allow the Executive to take certain actions regarding
trade sanctions. The Executive Branch's hesitancy to apply these
provisions of their own volition has forced a number of these issues into
the courtroom.
As a result, the Judiciary is put in the unenviable position of
resolving a political authority struggle while at the same time balancing
domestic law with U.S. international legal obligations. That balance is
difficult to maintain. Recent court rulings ordering the Executive Branch
to apply trade restriction provisions have prompted foreign nations to
charge that the provisions violate international trade agreements.
The Pelly Amendment, ESA, and Driftnet laws all began as statutes
protecting clearly identifiable U.S. resources. They have evolved to
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serve as enforcement mechanisms to international laws that might
otherwise be purely precatory. However, in a shrinking world, the
recent application of some of these laws raises serious questions about
the role of the United States as a global ocean policeman.
To achieve conservation goals and to avoid potentially disruptive
trade disputes, the U.S. Legislative and Executive Branches should work
to integrate marine conservation and free trade policies rather than
demand the Judiciary to fashion inflexible court orders which will likely
subject U.S. policies to scrutiny by arbiters of international agreements.

